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ABSTRACT
Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts
where only minority–group candidates are permitted to contest. Such quotas have been imple-
mented in India for certain social groups and for women, although gender quotas in the legislature
are popular in several other countries. This paper builds a political–economy model to analyze
the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. Our model predicts that, in
situations where the minority–group is economically disadvantaged and where voters favor candi-
dates from their own group, such a quota actually reduces transfers to poorer groups. Moreover,
redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within–(minority) group inequality.
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1 Introduction
Serious concerns exist about the extent to which minority groups participate in policy–making.
These concerns are heightened when the minorities are socio–economically disadvantaged. For
example, blacks in the US are a minority who exhibit lower levels of educational attainments
and greater poverty, as compared to whites. Women, though not always a minority, enjoy rather
limited participation in various domains. Many countries have implemented quota requirements
in various occupations and institutions, often in the public sector, to correct for such anomalies.
Electoral quotas, which is the subject of this current paper, are quite popular. Currently over 100
countries use electoral quotas for women and over 38 countries have electoral quotas for minority
groups primarily in the form of reserved seats (Krook and O’Brien (2010)). Results from an
UNDP survey in 2010 indicate that 40% of the 91 countries studied have in place special electoral
measures to ensure the representation of minorities (Protsyk (2010)). The extent of representation
of women and minorities in political institutions is increasingly seen as an indication of “liberal
progressiveness” (Reynolds (2005)).
Among developing nations, India has in place wide–ranging affirmative action programs (often
termed “reservation”) for minority groups called the Scheduled Castes and Tribes; an important
component of this has been mandated representation in the legislature. The mandate involves ear-
marking a fraction of electoral districts where only these minority group candidates are permitted
to contest. More recently, similar policies have been implemented for women with the aim to
enhance their presence in politics.
A natural question that arises is the following: How does political reservation for a minority group
affect the conditions of the group–members living in these reserved districts? Several empirical
studies (discussed later) evaluate whether political reservation benefits the minority group in the
aggregate. However, the question of who gains and who loses within the minority group has
mostly been neglected.2 This question is especially relevant when the minority group — while
economically disadvantaged — exhibits a fair degree of heterogeneity in terms of income. So do
these political quotas benefit the poor within the minority or the rich? We seek answers to such
questions in this paper.
Tables 1 and 2 (see Section 5.1 in the appendix) have been constructed using data from the 43rd
National Sample Survey Organization’s (NSSO) consumer expenditure survey combined with par-
liamentary election data from India. The regressions in Table 1 are at the household level. The
negative and significant coefficients in the first row suggest that a household belonging to a re-
served electoral district is less likely to have been employed in government–funded Public Works
projects.3 This in turn points to the lack of implementation of such projects in these areas, sug-
gestive of lower transfers to the poor. In Table 2, the regressions are at the electoral district level.
The positive and significant coefficients in the first row suggest that reservation of a district is
associated with greater inequality within the Scheduled Castes living in the district.
These empirical patterns suggest that the gains to the minorities from political reservation may
2We defer a discussion of the related literature till the next section.
3India has implemented several employment–based poverty reduction programs (collectively known as Public
Works). Hence, these are effectively “transfers” to the poor.
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not be uniform. But what could potentially explain such non-uniformity? What may be the un-
derlying theoretical justification for such patterns? This paper attempts to answer such questions
by putting forward a tractable model which aims to highlight a political-economy channel linking
quotas to redistributive outcomes. The predictions of our model are consistent with the empiri-
cal correlations presented above. Specifically, the model delivers the following: (i) in the context
of an economically disadvantaged minority, political reservation reduces transfers to poorer (in-
come) groups when voters favor candidates from their own group. (ii) Such quotas lead to greater
inequality within the minority group.
The mechanism underlying our theory does not rely upon considerations of statistical discrimina-
tion, differences in reputation or ability across ethnic groups.4 Such factors may well be important.
However, one does not necessarily have to introduce them to generate the above predictions. In-
deed, our results stem from some key features of standard models of political competition. We
build on the following insight from these models of redistributive politics: when parties compete
for votes by promising transfers across different groups, the group with the least ideological bias
(the “swing” group) is most favored by all parties. The standard probabilistic–voting setup, a la
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), is modified and extended to a two–stage game here.
The first stage involves parties choosing candidates from one of the two ethnic groups. The pres-
ence of political quotas implies that the district in question may be contested only by members of
the ethnic minority thereby restricting the choice in the first stage. In the second stage, the fielded
candidates propose redistribution policies. We impose some structure on the ideological bias of
a generic voter. We assume that ceteris paribus every voter feels a positive bias for a candidate
from his own ethnic group. The other component of the ideological bias stems from a party–wise
affiliation, with poorer voters ex ante preferring a certain party while their richer counterparts ex
ante preferring the other one; call the former a “pro–poor” party and the latter “pro–rich”.5
The key point is this: reservation, by influencing the ethnic identities of the fielded candidates,
potentially has an effect on a voter’s overall ideological bias and thereby on the identity of the
swing group. This, in turn, affects the nature of redistribution in equilibrium. First, consider a
reserved district. Here the ideological bias of any voter is driven by simply the party bias; the
ethnic bias loses relevance as the two candidates are from the same ethnic group (by mandate, the
minority). So the swing group is presumably some intermediate income group which is neither too
poor nor too rich. Next, consider the following “mixed–ethnicity candidate” situation. Suppose
the “pro–poor” party fields a candidate from the minority while the rival party picks one from the
majority group. In this scenario, both types of biases matter. The swing group here is basically an
income group where the majority ethnic types (who form the bulk of the group) exhibit near–zero
(ex ante) bias. Where exactly in the income distribution is this possible? It is precisely true for
a‘poor’ rather than some middle income group. A ‘poor’ majority ethnic type prefers the “pro–
poor” party but is averse to this party’s candidate on ethnic considerations; thus making him largely
indifferent between the two options. Therefore the swing group in this situation is relatively poor
4We use the term “ethnic” group here to refer to the two segments of the population: the majority and the minority.
The relevant marker need not be ethnicity; it could be language, race or even gender. However, for ease of exposition
we continue to use the term “ethnicity”.
5One could think of one party being more leftist in its ideological position and hence attracting the “toiling masses”
while the other party could be thought of as more “pro–business” and so more right–wing.
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in contrast to the one in a reserved district.
Political reservation, by eliminating such “mixed–ethnicity candidate” cases, results in penalizing
lower–income groups. But what of the other possible “mixed–ethnicity candidate ” case? Namely,
where the “pro–poor” party fields a candidate from the majority while the rival party picks one
from the minority group. We show that such is not possible in equilibrium. Therefore, we have
that the transfers in a reserved district end up being concentrated at intermediate rather than lower
income groups. This leads to a widening of disparities within the economically disadvantaged
minority group. To be sure, this is also true for the majority group. But if the minority group is
indeed strictly economically disdvantaged to begin with, then the implications in terms of increased
within–group inequality are more salient for them.
We also discuss the effect of an across–the–board change in the size of the ethnic bias. It seems
plausible (even if a trifle optimistic) that with the passage of time ethnic biases become less im-
portant. It turns out, perhaps somewhat intriguingly, that the effect of (exogenously) lowering
the ethnic bias on redistribution is far from unambiguous. Although it is possible that reducing
the bias makes the effect of reservation less pronounced on the equilibrium redistribution policy, it
also may make the “mixed–ethnicity candidate” scenario more likely. Recall, the “mixed–ethnicity
candidate” case is essentially where the introduction of the political quota has a marked impact.
Thus, the two opposing forces make the net effect indeterminate.
Some of the restrictions in the baseline model are subsequently relaxed to check the robustness of
the main results. First, the political parties are endowed with intrinsic policy preferences which
explicitly justify calling them “pro–poor” and “pro–rich”. Specifically, the former is allowed to
care more about the consumption of poorer groups relative to the latter. We show that this does
not alter the main findings in any significant way. Although in this case, there is no longer policy
convergence in equilibrium. Next, we change the baseline model to allow for differentiation in
transfers between voters within the same income group on the basis of ethnicity: so it is possible to
promise a poor voter a higher transfer than another similarly poor voter as long as the two are from
different ethnic groups.6 Here again the intuition of the baseline model prevails and the findings
are qualitatively similar.
These findings should not be interpreted as an indictment of political quotas. It may well be
that quotas are required to enhance minority participation to the degree that they feel confident
about running for elections in districts which are not reserved. The model is really relevant in the
scenario where minorities do actually participate in elections though perhaps not at par with the
majority group. If one believes that quotas are necessary — at least initially — to induce minority
candidates to run in non–reserved districts then our theory is useful to evaluate the effects of such
quotas at a point later in time; specifically, in the stage where minority candidates are running for
office in non–reserved districts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
existing related literature. Section 3 contains the basic model while Section 4 considers some
extensions; Section 5 concludes. All proofs and tables are contained in the Appendix.
6Strictly speaking, this bears strong overtones of sheer discrimination based on ethnicity and maybe illegal to
implement.
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2 Related Literature
This paper is part of the broad literature which studies the impact of ethnic/gender quotas on socio-
economic outcomes. There have been several studies on the impact of reservation on the provision
of publicly provided goods at local levels of government like village councils (see, e.g., Besley
et al (2004), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2008), Bardhan, Mookherjee and Parra Torrado (2010)).
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a, 2004b) use political reservations for women in India to study
the impact of women’s leadership on policy decisions. Pande (2003) finds that political reservation
for SCs in the state legislature has resulted in observable rise in targeted transfers towards these
groups. These papers provide evidence that political reservation does make a difference to policy
outcomes; specifically, there is a shift in policy towards delivering what the minority groups (or
women) want. Dunning and Nilekani (2013) investigate the socio-economic effects of political
quotas for SCs at the village councils level. They find weak distributive effects of quotas for these
marginalized groups. Their findings also suggest that cross-cutting partisan ties can reduce the
distributive effect of such ethnic quotas.
Chauchard (2014) focuses on the changing perceptions of SCs in society due to political quotas.
Jensenius (2015) uses a unique dataset of development indicators for more than 3,000 state assem-
bly constituencies in 15 Indian states in 1971 and 2001. Matching constituencies on pre-treatment
variables from 1971, she finds that 30 years of quotas had no aggregate effect on development
indicators for SCs in reserved constituencies. Chin and Prakash (2011) estimate the impact of
political reservation in the state–level legislature on overall state–level poverty. They find that,
at the state–level, ST reservation reduces poverty while SC reservation has no such impact. The
present contribution complements these studies: we present a theory which links reservation to
redistributive outcomes in general and provides predictions regarding the effect of reservation on
within–minority inequality while emphasizing a particular political–economy channel.
Our paper directly relates to theoretical models of affirmative action in various contexts: labor mar-
ket participation or educational institutions. Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2006) posit a model
which show that racial divisions reduce support for welfare expenditures; this happens even if
voters have color-blind preferences. They show that relatively advantaged members of both the
majority and minority group gain from having a second dimension of redistribution, while the less
advantaged members of the majority are the principal losers. Their focus on the dispersion of
gains among heterogenous agents within ethnic groups is close in spirit to our paper though their
mechanism is different. Ray and Sethi (2010) address the issue of elite educational institutions
adopting criteria that meet diversity goals without being formally contingent on applicant iden-
tity. They establish that under weak conditions such color-blind affirmative action policies must be
non-monotone, i.e., within each social group, some students with lower scores are admitted while
others with higher scores are denied.
In terms of ramifications of electoral re-districting/changing ‘reservation’ status, our paper is con-
nected to the literature on US politics of minority representation. The practice of changing political
boundaries to create majority-minority electoral districts as a means to increase representation of
minority groups is prevalent in the US (see e.g., Cameron et al. (1996), Epstein and O’Halloran
(1999), Lublin (1999)). Several scholars take the position that minority representatives will act in
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the interest of their group on assuming power (see e.g., the discussion in Mansbridge (1999)). In
many developing countries, women are also a population minority thus re-inforcing their limited
participation (see, e.g., Sen (1990, 1992), Anderson and Ray (2010, 2012)). Also, the perception
is that women are better geared towards representing the interests of women (see e.g., Mansbridge
(1999, 2003)).
Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) argue that the introduction of gender quotas in Latin America caused
an exogenous increase in womens representation. But they uncover no major effects beyond mere
representation. Several studies (see Rosie Campbell and Lovenduski (2010), Svaleryd (2009),
Skjeie (1991), Krook (2006), Beaman et al. (2009) among others) support the view that women
have political preferences which often vary from those of men. The idea that blacks are more
suitable for representing blacks (in the context of the US) has been discussed in Mansbridge (1999)
and Minta (2009) among others. For India, scholars have argued that voting often takes place along
caste lines (see e.g., Banerjee and Pande (2007)).
Our paper shares certain similarities with Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001). These
papers analyze models in which it is possible to target budget allocations to infinitesimally small
groups. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) ask how political support for welfare programs depend
upon the inequality in incomes in society. In terms of the focus on diversity and redistribution, our
paper relates to Ferna´ndez and Levy (2008). They study the relationship between redistribution
and taste diversity using a model with endogenous platforms involving redistribution and targeted
public goods, and find a non–monotonic relationship. Levy and Razin (2015) studies the question
of whether more polarisation of voters’ opinions necessarily lead to a polarisation of policies. They
argue that it may happen — particularly, in less competetive elections — that increased polarisation
of voter opinions may actually lead to lower levels of policy polarisation.
Our emphasis on ethnic bias in voting relates to Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014). They
provide several examples under which behavioural biases might be beneficial for voters when one
takes into account the strategic behaviour of politicians. Huber (2012) builds several measures
of the “ethnicization” of electoral behavior. Using survey data from 43 countries, he shows that
proportional electoral laws are associated with lower levels of ethnicization. Baldwin and Huber
(2010) examine the differences between various measures of ethnic diversity. They argue that the
choice between them affects our understanding of which countries are most ethnically diverse.
They also show that one of the measures has a large, robust, and negative relationship with public
goods provision, whereas several others do not.
Huber and Ting (2013) examine why citizens may vote against redistributive policies from which
they stand to gain. Their model describes the situations under which poor voters support right-wing
parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left-wing parties
that favor high taxes and redistribution. Their model also emphasizes the role of party discipline
during legislative bargaining in affecting the prominence of redistribution in voter behavior. In
terms of aligning incentives of voters with political actors, our paper relates to Myerson (2006).
He studies various problems associated with democratization with a focus on how the structure of
federalism and decentralization may affect the chances of success for a new democracy.
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3 The Model
Society is populated by a unit mass of individuals and every individual — indexed by i — is
characterized by two features. One is individual i’s income, denoted by wi, and the other is i’s
ethnicity, denoted by ei.7 Every individual belongs to either one of two groups: majority/ ‘high
mass’ (h) or minority/ ‘low mass’ (l). Hence for every i, ei ∈ {h, l}.
Let the distribution of incomes in society be represented by the cdf G with support on [0, w] where
w > 0 is “large”. Take any income level w. Let pi(w) denote the proportion of w-earners who
are type l. Also, let pi(w) be continuous in w. In society, the l–types form a minority. Hence,
w∫
0
pi(w) dG(w) < 1
2
. Also, the l–types are economically disadvantaged; their numbers tend to
dwindle as w increases. To capture this aspect, we assume that there is some threshold income
level, call it w, beyond which pi(w) is weakly decreasing in w with pi(w) < 1/2.
A balanced-budget redistribution — or simply redistribution for short — is a continuous function
z : [0, w]→ R, where z(w) is the transfer to each individual earning w, and:
(i) z satisfies the budget constraint
w∫
0
z(w) dG(w) = 0.
(ii) Every individual’s net consumption (≡ w + z(w)) is non–negative.
We will denote the set of all such functions by Z.
There are two political parties, denoted by R and P , where R is viewed as pro–rich, and P as pro–
poor, in a sense that we make precise below. Each party fields a candidate of some ethnicity who
proposes a particular redistribution from the set Z. However, the constituency in question may be
reserved for l–type candidates. In this case, each party is constrained to field a l–type candidate.
Note, the game proceeds in two stages: in the first stage, the parties choose their respective candi-
dates concurrently while in the second stage, the candidates make simultaneous offers of redistri-
bution. The second stage game is also referred to as the “expected–plurality game” subsequently.
Let γ denote the candidate ethnicity configuration in the following manner:
γ = (e(P ), e(R))
where the first argument refers to P–candidate’s type and the second refers to party R–candidate’s
type. Therefore, γ ∈ {(h, h), (l, l), (l, h), (h, l)}. Note, γ is determined by the parties’ choices in
the first stage. For a reserved constituency, γ = (l, l) by definition.
An individual’s preferences over candidates (and their proposed policies) are described as follows.
First, individual i exhibits a bias αi, positive or negative, for party P . The corresponding payoff
from R is normalized to be zero; hence αi is really the net bias for party P . This bias has two
main components: one that stems from i’s emotive affiliation with party P (relative to R), and the
other which arises from i’s association with the ethnic identity of party P ’s candidate (relative to
R’s candidate).
7As mentioned earlier, ei could stand for i’s race, religion, gender or any such non–income marker.
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Specifically, we assume that individual i feels an affiliation t(wi) with party P (relative to R),
which is continuous and naturally decreasing in w.8 Thus, t : [0, w] → R. As for the “ethnic
bias”, assume that the voter feels some degree of association for a candidate of the same type as
the voter.9 This would depend upon the candidate configuration γ and hence we denote it by si(γ).
Combining, we write
α(wi, ei) = t(wi) + si(γ).
Here, si(γ) takes on one of the three values: s, −s, or 0 where s > 0. In particular, when P ′s
(R′s) candidate is from the same ethnic group as voter i while R′s (P ′s) candidate is from the other
group, then the ethnic bias for voter i equals s (−s). Note, when both parties field candidates
from the same ethnic group, this type–based association factor effectively cancels out. Hence,
si(h, h) = si(l, l) = 0.
This is not to say that a h–type voter is indifferent between γ = (h, h) and γ = (l, l). She may
strictly prefer (h, h) over (l, l). However, when it comes to determining si(γ) this does not matter
as si(γ) is the net bias towards P ′s candidate relative to R’s candidate. Analogous considerations
apply to any l–type voter.10
Therefore, for any individual i:
si(γ) = s if e(P ) 6= e(R) and ei = e(P )
si(γ) = −s if e(P ) 6= e(R) and ei = e(R)
si(γ) = 0 if e(P ) = e(R).
We can now write individual i’s bias as
αi = α(wi, ei) + i,
where the extra term i is just mean-zero noise. The individual sees the realization of i before
she votes; the politicians (the parties and their candidates) do not; more on this below. We assume
that i is independently and identically distributed across individuals, with a symmetric, unimodal
density f (and corresponding cdf F ) that has its support on R.
To this non-pecuniary bias αi we add the economic benefit from a proposed redistribution to arrive
at the overall payoff. Recall z(w) is the transfer to each individual earning w. We write the
economic benefit to an individual earning w from redistribution z ∈ Z as
m(z, w) ≡ u(w + z(w)),
8In this sense, P is viewed as pro–poor. Also, in equilibrium, P ’s actions confirm this label.
9There could be long–standing reasons for such bias; say, for e.g., asymmetric information (better knowledge of
members of own type). Such behavior has been dubbed as “homophily” in many social contexts. In India, there is
plenty of anecdotal evidence on voting behavior along caste lines. Also, there is evidence of bias against women
leaders. See Banerjee and Pande (2007) and Beaman et al. (2009), among others.
10Here, every voter is assumed to cast his vote in favor of one party’s candidate or the other. Of course, one could
introduce the notion of “costly voting” where say any h–type voter may feel reluctant to vote for either party when he
observes γ = (l, l). This would no doubt lead to interesting predictions for turnout but we do not pursue this direction
here.
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Parties select 
candidates 
Candidates 
propose  
policies 
Each voter 
draws bias αi 
Voters cast 
their votes 
Figure 1: Timing of the game
where u denotes a utility function with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and u′(0) =∞.
Say party P ’s candidate proposes x, and R’s candidate proposes y where x, y ∈ Z. An individual
i earning wi, with bias αi will vote for party P ’s candidate if
m(x, wi) + αi > m(y, wi),
will vote for R’s candidate if the opposite inequality holds, and will be indifferent in case of
equality.
From the perspective of the party, any individual’s vote is stochastic. The probability that citizen i
will vote for party P ’s candidate is given by
pi ≡ 1− F (m(y, wi)−m(x, wi)− α(wi, ei)) .
The expected plurality for party P is proportional to
∫
i
pi,11 and this is what party P ’s candidate
seeks to maximize — and party R’s candidate minimize — through the appropriate choice of
policy in the second stage, conditional on candidate choice in the prior stage. Figure 1 depicts the
sequence of moves in the game.
Recall that in the first stage of the game, the two parties choose their respective candidates and
hence determine γ. Of course, this choice is trivial in a reserved constituency where γ = (l, l)
by mandate. We turn to an explicit discussion of party payoffs (which would drive the first stage
choices) in section 3.3.
The redistribution profile (x,y) proposed by the fielded candidates of P and R, respectively, in
equilibrium will — in principle — depend on γ.12 Therefore, for any given γ, an equilibrium of
the expected–plurality game is defined by a redistribution pair (x,y) which constitute mutual best
responses from the perspective of the two candidates. Note, that this expected–plurality game is
by nature, a zero–sum game.
3.1 Equilibrium
We use the standard notion of subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept for this game. To be
specific, an equilibrium of this game is given by a collection of candidate choices and redistribution
policies, {e(P ), e(R);x,y}, which satisfy the following:
11To be precise, the expected plurality is given by
∫
i
[pi − (1− pi)] =
∫
i
[2pi − 1].
12 We will make this dependence explicit by indexing all relevant parameters by γ.
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(i) The redistribution policies x and y constitute mutual best–responses for the fielded candidates
given (e(P ), e(R)).
(ii) The candidate choices (e(P ), e(R)) constitute mutual best–responses for the two parties given
the redistribution policies x and y.
Existence: This can be guaranteed by simply assuming — like in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)
— that party P ’s candidate’s objective function, namely
∫
i
pi, is concave in x for any given y and
convex in y for any given x.
Characterization: We now proceed to describe the set of equlibria for this simple game. Given the
equilibrium notion adopted, we start by solving backwards.
It will be useful to define the term
σ(γ, w) ≡ pi(w)f(α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(α(w, h))
This term is important for subsequent analysis and hence requires some interpretation. First, fix a
candidate configuration γ; this effectively pins down the ethnic bias for every voter. Now consider
some level of income, say w, the values α(w, l) and α(w, h) are “small” in magnitude. This
basically means that the group characterized by income level w (group w henceforth, for brevity),
does not exhibit much partisan bias ex-ante. Recall that the density f is unimodal and symmetric
around 0. Hence, such lack of strong bias indicates that σ(γ, w) will exhibit a high value.
Alternatively, if the values α(w, l) and α(w, h) are “large” in magnitude — suggesting that the
members of group w feel strongly about one party vis–a–vis the other party — then σ(γ, w) will
exhibit a low value for this group w. In this sense, one can think of σ(γ, w) as representing the
“average swing propensity” of group w. It captures the extent to which the members of a group
may be willing to switch loyalties.
From the perspective of the parties, the groups with high “swing” propensity assume importance
as they are ex-ante more responsive to transfers. The following proposition makes this explicit.
PROPOSITION 1. For any given candidate configuration γ, there is a unique equilibrium of this
expected–plurality game. In that equilibrium, there is a unique redistribution scheme xγ offered
by both parties, with the property that
σ(γ, w)[u′(w + x(w))] = λγ
for every w in [0, w] and some λγ > 0. Moreover, w + x(w) varies positively with σ(γ, w).
Proof. (See Appendix.)
Recall the “class bias” t(w) felt by an individual in group w. We will assume the following:
t(w) ≥ s and t(w) < 0.
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By the continuity of t, there will be some w ∈ (w,w), call it w∗, such that t(w∗) = 0.13 One can
think of this group w∗ as the “middle income” group which feels equally class–wise affiliated to
either party.
Proposition 1 provides a clue as to which type of w–groups will be most favored by both parties in
equilibrium. It is the groups with high values of σ(γ, w). Specifically, the group(s) where σ(γ, w)
is maximized — the “swing” group(s) — is (are) the biggest gainer(s). We denote these groups as
members of the set Wγ and a generic member of this set as wγ . Clearly, depending upon γ, this set
could be a singleton.14 Moreover, by the continuity of σ(γ, w) in w we know that the net transfer
is going to be relatively high in income groups “close” to any wγ ∈ Wγ; hence, the focus on Wγ .
The explicit dependence of the set Wγ on γ is the subject of the ensuing section (section 3.2).
3.2 Redistribution policies under different candidate configurations
We now examine, one by one, what the equilibrium redistribution policies look like for the different
possible choices of candidate configuration γ in the first stage.
We start with the configuration (l, h), i.e., party P fields an l–group candidate while party R
fields a h–group candidate. Here, we show that any group which is swing, i.e. belongs to Wγ ,
must necessarily lie to the left of the income group w∗. To put it in another way, the focus of
redistributive tranfers is on groups earning lesser than the middle income group. The following
proposition makes this point more formally.
PROPOSITION 2. Take a constituency with γ = (l, h) and consider the swing group set Wγ . Here
the swing group(s) is (are) poorer than the group w∗, i.e., wγ < w∗ for every wγ ∈ Wγ .
Proof. (See Appendix.)
The next proposition considers the case in which both parties field candidates from the same ethnic
group; hence, γ ∈ {(l, l), (h, h)}. Note, this subsumes the case of a reserved constituency. Recall
that for such configurations, we have si(γ) = 0 for every voter i. Thus, the ethnic–affiliation
component of every voter’s bias loses relevance.
PROPOSITION 3. In a constituency in which both parties field candidates from the same ethnic
group, group w∗ is the “swing” group in equilibrium. Hence, Wγ = {w∗} for γ ∈ {(l, l), (h, h)}.
Proof. (See Appendix.)
13If t is weakly decreasing then there could be an income interval where the value of t is 0. The distinction between
a unique w∗ versus an interval makes no significant difference to the results that follow. So for ease of exposition, we
will proceed as if w∗ is unique.
14We know that Wγ is non-empty for any given γ since the function σ(γ,w) is continuous in w and is defined over
a compact set [0, w].
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A quick eye–balling of the two preceding propositions above provides some inkling about which
types of groups get preferential treatment under the different candidate configurations. Clearly,
γ = (l, h) is more geared towards benefitting lower income groups in relation to configurations
involving candidates from the same ethnic group, i.e., γ ∈ {(l, l), (h, h)}.
This leaves us with the case where γ = (h, l), i.e., e(P ) = h and e(R) = l. We will return to this
case later. Now we move to on the details of the first stage game.
3.3 Candidate choice by parties
So far the discussion has focused on equilibrium redistribution policies and identity of “swing”
groups given a candidate configuration. Recall that the parties are free to choose their candidates
in unreserved constituencies in the first stage of the game.15
Now we will describe the payoffs to the parties in detail. Both parties care about their respective
performance in the election, specifically, their (respective) expected pluralities; in other words,
they are office–seeking to some degree. Each party also cares about the effect fielding a candidate
of either ethnic group has on what we call the “cohesiveness” of the party.
The basic idea is the following. First, there is the issue of compliance of the fielded candidate
with regards to the party leadership should the former actually win the election. It makes sense
to assume that an l–group candidate is more compliant with the leadership’s decisions than an h–
group one. Secondly, there is the issue of within–party cooperation across the two ethnic groups;
alternatively, one could think of this as the degree of tolerance for l–group members by their h–
group counterparts. So, “cohesiveness” of a party depends upon both of these factors: compliance
and tolerance.
We use a simple (reduced form) way of capturing these aspects. Let the payoff to party j, for
j = P,R, be given by
Wj(γ) + χcj(e(j))
where Wj(γ) is the expected plurality under configuration γ, cj(e(j)) is the cohesiveness for party
j from choosing candidate type e(j) and χ > 0 is the weight accorded to it. So, cj : {l, h} → R
for j = P,R.
Suppose that parties can only field their members as candidates and any citizen can potentially join
any political party. However, party R by its very nature attracts richer individuals, as compared to
party P .16 Hence, the relatively wealthier section of society will populate R.17 This means that the
proportion of l–group members in party R is strictly lower than in P (since l–type citizens are on
average poorer than the h–type ones). This suggests that tolerance is higher in party P than in R
when each of the parties consider fielding an l–type candidate.
15 In principle, there could be equilibria in which one or both political parties play mixed strategies, i.e., randomize
between fielding an l–group candidate and a h–group candidate. We restrict attention to only those equilibria in which
each political party fields a candidate rather than randomizing since this seems more natural in our setting.
16Recall, R is pro–rich which can be interpreted as being “pro–business”, more “right–wing”, etc.
17This joining of political parties by politicians is a coalition formation process which could have been written out
in a more sequenced manner. However, this reduced form approach pursued here is adequate for our purposes.
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The “cohesiveness” payoff from fielding a h–type candidate is normalized to 0 for both parties.
Observe that there is a large pool of h–type members in both parties who are eligible for candidacy.
So it seems reasonable that this would affect cohesiveness in the same way in the two parties.
Hence, cP (h) = cR(h) = 0. For ease of notation, we will denote cj(l) simply as cj for j = P,R.
As noted earlier, it seems reasonable to assume that the compliance factor is positive for an l–type
candidate for either party as the l–group is a minority in either party and also from their minority
status in society. As per the tolerance part, we argued earlier than it is greater in party P .
Combining, we can write
cP > max{0, cR}.
This sets the ground for identifying the set of candidate configurations that can be observed in
equilibrium in any unreserved constituency. The following proposition is a step in that direction.
PROPOSITION 4. In any unreserved constituency, the candidate configuration γ = (h, l) will not
be observed in equilibrium.
Proof. (See Appendix.)
Proposition 4 rules out the possibility of the configuration (h, l) in an unreserved constituency.
However one may ask — in the context of an unreserved constituency — if (h, h) is the only
possible candidate configuration in equilibrium. After all, if the candidate configuration (l, h) is
like–wise ruled out then political reservation would not affect the equilibrium redistribution policy
at all.
Next, we examine when configuration (l, h) can arise in the equilibrium of this game.
Consider the configuration (h, h). Here, the ethnic bias component is irrelevant for every voter;
hence, si(h, h) = 0 for every voter i. Here the payoff to P is WP (h, h) =
∫
i
pi since the cohesion
payoff from fielding a h–type candidate has been normalized to zero. Now,∫
i
pi =
w∫
0
[pi(w)[1− F (−α(w, l))] + (1− pi(w))[1− F (−α(w, h))]] dG(w)
which simplifies to
w∫
0
[1− F (−t(w))] dG(w) since α(w, h) = α(w, l) = t(w).
Under the configuration (l, h), we have α(w, l) = t(w) + s and α(w, h) = t(w)− s. Hence,
WP (l, h) =
w∫
0
[pi(w)[1− F (−t(w)− s)] + (1− pi(w))[1− F (−t(w) + s)]] dG(w)
Now for P given that R is fielding h, fielding l will be (weakly) preferred to h if and only if
WP (l, h) + χcP ≥ WP (h, h). (1)
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Note that
1− F (−t(w)− s) > 1− F (−t(w)) > 1− F (−t(w) + s)
for every w ∈ [0, w]. This introduces some ambiguity in ranking WP (l, h) and WP (h, h). In-
tuitively, in switching from (h, h) to (l, h), party P potentially gains the support of some l–type
voters while it potentially loses some h–type supporters.
To be specific, the extent of loss and gain of votes depends on the distribution of the biases among
the voters (F (.)), the proportion of l–type voters across income groups (pi(.)), the function t(.),
the size of ethnic bias s as well as the income distribution (G(.)). Moreover, the term χcP (the
additional cohesiveness payoff to party P from fielding an l–type candidate as opposed to an h–
type candidate) is positive. Hence, the ambiguity in comparing the two payoffs for party P .18
Notice, any factor which raises cP would make (l, h) more likely in equilibrium. In this regard
without explicitly turning to a dynamic version of this model, one can discuss the role of quotas in
increasing political participation of the minorities over time. In particular, one could imagine that
cP is increasing in the degree of participation of the minorities as long as their participation rate
is no higher than that of the majority group. Specifically, quotas would espouse greater tolerance
towards minority politicians in party P arising through greater interaction across ethnic groups in
the political domain and hence raising cP over time. Therefore, the presence of quotas early on in
time would actually make (l, h) more likely in equilibrium.
Additionally, one can make the following claim about observing (l, h) in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose in a unreserved constituency, the candidate configuration γ = (l, h)
is observed in equilibrium. Now take this constituency and increase the proportion of the l–types
(pi(w)) in at least one income group w while making no other changes. Then γ = (l, h) continues
to be observed in equilibrium.
Proof. (See Appendix.)
Thus, Proposition 5 suggests that the configuration γ = (l, h) is more likely to be observed in
constituencies where the l–group, while a minority, is relatively sizeable.
Taking stock, in an unreserved constituency the only possible configurations in equilibrium are
(h, h), (l, l) and (l, h). The first two configurations yield identical redistributions in equilibrium
(see Proposition 3) while the last configuration produces a redistribution policy which favors poorer
groups (see Proposition 2). In sum, reservation appears to bias policy against poorer groups.
So far we have two political parties P and R towards whom voters feel affiliated on the basis of
their incomes; in particular, poor voters tend to favor P while rich voters tend to favorR. However,
in equilibrium both parties propose the same redistribution policy. This might raise the question as
to why party affiliations take such a form when both parties propose identical redistribution policies
in equilibrium. However, there is an important distinction in the actions of the two parties which
justifies — at least, to some extent — the “pro–poor” and “pro–rich” labels. Recall, P fields an
l–type candidate (in some cases) in response to R′s fielding a h–type candidate and this improves
18This ambiguity is in sharp contrast with the case of γ = (h, l) which has been dealt with earlier.
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the condition of poorer groups by shifting the focus of targeting towards them. In this way, P does
favor poorer groups through its actions; specifically, through its candidate choice. However, this
still leaves us open to the criticism that the fielded candidates in a constituency behave identically
regardless of their party affiliations.
In the following section, the baseline model is amended so as to relax some of the assumptions
made so far. As discussed in detail below, the main intuition is robust to such changes.
4 Extensions of the Model
4.1 Intrinsic policy preferences of parties
Here, we explicitly allow candidates to instrinsically care about their proposed redistribution poli-
cies alongside expected vote shares. In particular, one can model P ’s candidate to care more (less)
about the consumption of poorer (richer) groups relative to R’s candidate. In this manner, the par-
ties can be more easily categorized as “pro–poor” and “pro–rich”. What is interesting is that it is
possible to introduce this aspect without altering the main findings in any significant way, although
there is no longer policy convergence in equilibrium.
In particular, now suppose party P ′s candidate maximizes the following:∫
i
pi +
w∫
0
ρ(w)d(w)dG(w).
Note,
∫
i
pi is P ′s expected vote share and d(w) is the utility differential u(w+y(w))−u(w+x(w)),
just as before. Here, ρ(w) is a real-valued, continuous function with ρ′ > 0 and ρ(w∗) = 0. Note,
w∗ represents the intermediate income group where t(w) is 0, as before.
Party R′s candidate continues to maximize — as before — the following term: 1− ∫
i
pi.
By construction, P ’s candidate now has an incentive to have d(w) (the utility shortfall from P ′s
candidates’ perspective) as negative for groups with w < w∗ and d(w) > 0 for groups with
w > w∗. So P ’s candidate has an incentive to “outbid” R’s candidate for groups with income
lower than w∗ while for richer groups, i.e., for w > w∗, P ’s candidate has an incentive to “bid”
below R’s candidate.
4.1.1 Description of the second–stage equilibrium
Suppose (x,y) is an equilibrium of this (second–stage) redistribution choice game, conditional on
candidate configuration choice γ.
Like in Proposition 1 of the baseline model, the following relations must hold. The marginal gain
in payoff to party P from a marginal increase in transfer to any group w must be equalized across
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all (income) groups. Therefore,
[ν(γ, w)− ρ(w)]u′(x(w) + w) = λ
The same consideration applies to party R. Hence,
ν(γ, w)u′(y(w) + w) = µ
where
ν(γ, w) ≡ pi(w)f(d(w)− α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− α(w, h)).
Note, ν(γ, w) is positive for all (γ, w). However, ρ(w) is non-negative only for w ≥ w∗. This
implies we need some restriction on ρ(.) so that marginal gain in payoff to party P from a marginal
increase in transfer to any group w is always positive. Intuitively, if ρ(.) is “sufficiently” bounded
then both λ and µ will be positive. It is easy enough to outline such a sufficient condition.
Note, |α(w, e)| ≤ s + max{t(0),−t(w)} for e = l, h. Also, d(w) is continuous in w and given
that both x and y are budget–balanced schemes ensures that there is some upper bound — call it d
— such that |d(w)| ≤ d for every w ∈ [0, w].
Hence, assuming
f(d+ s+max{t(0),−t(w)}) > max{ρ(w),−ρ(0)}
is sufficient to guarantee that λ, µ > 0. In the ensuing discussion, it is assumed that this condition
is met.
Consider the following relation obtained from the above two equations:
[ν(γ, w)− ρ(w)]u′(x(w) + w)
ν(γ, w)u′(y(w) + w)
=
λ
µ
.
Now we examine each of the following possibilities. (i) λ
µ
> 1, (ii) λ
µ
< 1 and (iii) λ
µ
= 1.
If we are in case (i), then it must be x(w∗) < y(w∗) since ρ(w∗) = 0 and u′′ < 0. Hence,
d(w∗) > 0. Also, for every w > w∗, it must be that d(w) > 0. To ensure that both x and y are
budget–balanced policies, it must be that d(w) < 0 for some interval of incomes for w < w∗.
Hence, we have d(w) > 0 for “high” incomes and d(w) < 0 for some “low” income groups.
Case (ii) is analogous with d(w) < 0 for every w < w∗ and d(w) > 0 for some interval of incomes
for w > w∗.
For case (iii), we have d(w) < 0 for every w < w∗, d(w) > 0 for every w > w∗ and d(w∗) = 0.
In principle, any of the three possibilties can arise in equilibrium depending upon the details of
ρ(.). However, case (iii) is the most compelling candidate for the following reason. One can
always construct an equilibrium corresponding to case (iii); such is not true for cases (i) and (ii).
For certain functional forms for ρ(.), one could construct revealed–preference type arguments to
16
show that cases (ii) and (iii) are not possible in equilibrium. For this reason, in the following
analysis we only focus on those equilibria (x,y) which belong to case (iii).
Hence, the equilibrium policy profile (x,y) for any given candidate configuration γ has the fol-
lowing property:
x(w) > y(w) if w < w∗
x(w) = y(w) if w = w∗
x(w) < y(w) if w > w∗
Thus, there is no longer policy convergence in equilibrium. Moreover, P ′s policy is more tilted
towards poorer groups while R′s policy is more tilted towards richer groups thus reflecting their
party identities. Next we study the equilibrium redistribution policy profile under different candi-
date configurations.
4.1.2 Redistribution under different candidate configurations
First consider the configuration (l, h), i.e., party P fields an l–group candidate in response to party
R fielding a h–group candidate. Like in the baseline model, we can show that the focus of targeting
— under (l, h) — is some group poorer than the middle-income group w∗. Recall, in this setup
parties propose different policies in equilibrium. Let party P ′s most favored group — the group
with the highest x(w) + w — be denoted by wP ; let wR be defined similarly. In principle, now
wP and wR could refer to distinct income groups depending upon the configuration γ, and thus
complicating matters relative to the baseline model. Hence, to simplify the arguments we make an
assumption concerning the share of the l–group voters in group w∗, i.e., pi(w∗).
The assumption — call it C1 — is the following:
f(s) > pi(w∗)f(s− ) + (1− pi(w∗))f(s+ )
for any  > 0.
As long as the minority group is “sufficiently” poor in the sense that pi(w∗) << 1/2, the above
condition will be easily met. The following proposition describes the relationship between wP , wR
and the middle income group w∗.
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose condition C1 is satisfied. Consider an unreserved constituency with
γ = (l, h). Then, party P ′s most favored group, namely wP , is poorer than the group w∗, while
party R′s most favored group wR is no richer than w∗. Hence, wP < w∗ and wR ≤ w∗.
Proof. (See Appendix.)
So under the configuration (l, h), the most favored group in equilibrium will either be wR ≤ w∗
(when party R wins) or some group wP < w∗ (when party P wins). Hence, in expected terms, the
most favored group is one which is poorer than the group w∗.
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Next, we move to candidate configurations where both parties field candidates from the same ethnic
group. Before proceeding, we make one more assumption concerning ρ(.). Let
[f(0)− f(|t(w)|) ≥ |ρ(w)|]
for all w ∈ [0, w].
This assumption — call it C2 — essentially imposes bounds on ρ(.).
Now, consider either of the two configurations: (h, h) or (l, l). Here, like in the baseline model,
we can show that the intermediate income group w∗ is most favored by both parties P and R. The
result is stated formally in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 7. Under condition C2, in a constituency in which both parties field candidates from
the same ethnicity, the group w∗ becomes the most favored group for both parties in equilibrium.
Therefore, wP = wR = w∗ in such a constituency.
Proof. (See Appendix.)
In this setup we allow that in every possible configuration γ, P ′s candidate has an intrinsic bias
in favor of poorer groups relative to R′s candidate. Also, this is something known by all players
— voters and party–members alike. However, for reasons of tractability, we continue to assume
that the first–stage considerations (specifically, the party payoff functions) are the same as those in
the baseline model. Hence for guaranteeing that the only possible equilibrium configurations in an
unreserved constituency are (h, h), (l, l) and (l, h), we can use the exact same arguments as in the
baseline model.
Next, we partially relax the assumption that transfers to all voters within the same income group
must be the same.
4.2 Within–(income) group differentiation
In the baseline model, it was feasible to redistribute across the income groups but within each
income group the transfer received by a voter was independent of the voter’s ethnic identity. In
other words, it was not possible to differentiate — in terms of transfers — between an l–type
voter and an h–type voter earning the same income w. Here we introduce the possibility of such a
differentiation though we assume that doing so involves a cost.
Specifically, when the transfer to a voter (w, e) is given by z(w, e), the cost is
1
2
ψ[z(w, l)− z(w, h)]2
where ψ is some positive real number.
The justification for assuming such a cost comes from that the fact that differentiating between
voters within the same income group on the basis of some congenital marker like ethnicity or
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religion is often looked down upon as sheer discrimination. Hence, it is overtly discouraged.
Therefore, to implement this kind of differentiation one has to pay a cost.19
In this setup, the across-income group and within-income group allocation decisions takes place
in two steps: (i) both candidates first announce the average per–capita transfer to every income
group w. Call this x(w) and y(w) for P and R, respectively. (ii) Subsequently they announce the
respective transfers to each ethnic group within a given income group. This is x(w, e) and y(w, e)
for P and R, respectively.
Note, in step (ii) the transfers to the different ethnic groups within a given income group must
respect the average per–capita transfer announced in step (i). Therefore,
pi(w)x(w, l) + (1− pi(w))x(w, h) = x(w)
and
pi(w)y(w, l) + (1− pi(w))y(w, h) = y(w)
for every income group w.
First, consider the case where γ is either (h, h) or (l, l). Under this scenario, the ethnicity bias (si
for voter i) is effectively zero and plays no role. There is no incentive to appeal more to a voter of
a particular ethnicity — within a given income group — as long as this is costly (ψ > 0). Hence,
here x(w, l) = x(w, h) = x(w) and y(w, l) = y(w, h) = y(w) for every w. Hence, we can invoke
Propositions 1 and 3 and conclude that both parties favor the w∗–group in equilibrium as in the
baseline model.
Now consider the case of γ = (l, h). We begin by noting that a symmetric equilibrium always
exists. Like in the baseline model (specifically in Proposition 1), it is the case that for P , the
equilibrium allocation of x(w) for all w must be such that redistributing across w must not yield
a higher expected voteshare; this yields an analogue to equation (4). The same is true for R.
Considering these two equations (analogues to equations (4) and (5)) together, we can see that
setting x(w) = y(w) is a solution to these first–order conditions.20 Other solutions where x(w) 6=
y(w) are possible but we restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium profiles for two reasons: first,
a symmetric equilibirum always exists while asymmetric equilirbia may not for certain parameter
values and functional forms. Secondly, this makes comparisons with the baseline model easier.
Even though identical platform choices occur in equilibrium, this does not mean that P and R do
not differentiate across voters within the same income group by ethnicity. Recall, the net expected
biases are given by α(w, l) = t(w)+ s and α(w, h) = t(w)− s. Consider P ′s problem conditional
on the choice of x(w) for any income group w. P ′s candidate chooses x(w, l) to maximize the
following expected payoff21:
maxx(w,l)pi(w)[1− F (d(w, l)− α(w, l))] + (1− pi(w))[1− F (d(w, h)− α(w, h))]
19This cost may be interpreted either as direct cost of implementation or as an indirect psychological or even
reputational cost.
20For brevity, we omit the explicit calculations. Also, the first–order conditions are necessary and sufficient as the
objective functions are concave in their respective arguments.
21Choosing x(w, l) automatically pins down x(w, h) since the budget constraint binds in equilibrium.
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2
ψ[x(w, l)− x(w, h)]2
s.t.
pi(w)x(w, l) + (1− pi(w))x(w, h) = x(w)
The first-order condition is given by:
pi(w)[f(d(w, l)− α(w, l))u′(w + x(w, l))− f(d(w, h)− α(w, h))u′(w + x(w, h))]
= ψ[x(w, l)− x(w, h)].
Recall γ = (l, h) implies α(w, l) = t(w) + s and α(w, h) = t(w) − s. Moreover, symmetric
equilibrium implies d(w, l) = d(w, h) = 0. Hence, FOC becomes:
pi(w)[f(t(w) + s)u′(w + x(w, l))− f(t(w)− s)u′(w + x(w, h))] = ψ[x(w, l)− x(w, h)] (2)
This implies
x(w, l) < x(w, h) if w < w∗
x(w, l) = x(w, h) if w = w∗
x(w, l) > x(w, h) if w > w∗
By equation (2), it is clear that the difference x(w, l) − x(w, h) is falling in the parameter ψ.
This is in line with our intuition: a higher cost (of differentiation) induces lesser differentiation in
equilibrium.
Now return to the choice of x(w). Recall, the equilibrium allocation of x(w) for all w must be such
that redistributing across w must not yield a higher expected voteshare for either party. Hence, the
following term is equalized across all w:
pi(w)f(t(w) + s)u′(w + x(w, l))
∂x(w, l)
∂x(w)
+ (1− pi(w))f(t(w)− s)u′(w + x(w, h))∂x(w, h)
∂x(w)
−ψ[x(w, l)− x(w, h)]
[
∂x(w, l)
∂x(w)
− ∂x(w, h)
∂x(w)
]
Call the above expression θ(w;ψ). Note, θ(w∗;ψ) = f(s)u′(w∗ + x(w∗)) since t(w∗) = 0 and
x(w∗, l) = x(w∗h) = x(w∗).
Next we claim that in this configuration (l, h), w + x(w) is maximized to the left of w∗ as long as
ψ is “sufficiently” high. This is an analogue of Proposition 2 of the baseline model.
PROPOSITION 8. There exists a threshold level of ψ beyond which w + x(w) is maximized to the
left of w∗ for the configuration (l, h).
Proof. (See Appendix.)
Thus, if we choose the cost of differentiation parameter ψ sufficiently high (as in the proof of
Proposition 8) then it is guaranteed that the average level of consumption w + x(w) is maximized
at some w < w∗; this is very much in the spirit of the baseline model. Also, given that the
magnitude of ψ limits the difference between x(w, l) and x(w, h) for any w, a high x(w) implies
a sizeable x(w, l). Therefore we can argue — like in the baseline model — that within-l group
inequality would increase by replacing (l, h) with (l, l) via quotas.
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4.3 Some Remarks on the Ethnic Bias
There are two aspects relating to the ethnic bias component which we discuss here. The first
relates to the question of allowing some degree of heterogeneity in the individual–level ethnic bias
component. The second is a question of how redistribution would respond — in equilibrium — to
a shift in the size of ethnic bias, i.e., a change in s.
4.3.1 Heterogeneity of the bias.
In the baseline model, the size of the ethnic bias for every individual was either 0 or a given s > 0.
It possible to allow some extent of heterogeneity in this respect without substantially affecting the
results in any way. Suppose, instead of the baseline model structure of ethnic bias, we have the
following. For any individual i:
si(γ) = ψi if e(P ) 6= e(R) and ei = e(P )
si(γ) = −ψi if e(P ) 6= e(R) and ei = e(R)
si(γ) = 0 if e(P ) = e(R).
where ψi = s + ηi and −ψi = −s + ηi. Suppose η is just mean–zero noise and each i draws ηi
from some given distribution. As long as η–distribution is independent of the income distribution
(i.e., ηi and wi are independent) the game is basically unchanged. We can rewrite αi as follows:
αi = t(wi) + s+ υi
where υi = ηi + i and let υi be distributed according to a symmetric, unimodal density f with
support on R (like i was in the baseline model). This makes it clear that the basic structure of the
game is the same as before; hence, all our results obtain. Of course, if the distribution of η and
income distribution were related in some way, then there could be important differences. We do
not pursue this avenue in this paper as it is not obvious as to what form such a correlation between
ethnic bias and income should take.22
4.3.2 Changes in the size of the bias.
One may ask: what happens to the nature of redistribution in equilibrium as society becomes more
and more ethnically biased? In the context of our baseline model, this tantamounts to a comparative
statics exercise with respect to s, the parameter which represents the size of the ethnic bias.
Now, it is straightforward to see that if we set s = 0, then the swing group would be the middle
income group w∗ regardless of the candidate configuration chosen in the first stage. In general for
s > 0, the set comprising the swing group(s), namely, Wγ need not be a singleton set for various
22These could be related in several different ways. For example, one could assume a negative correlation between
ηi and wi suggesting that poorer individuals have stronger ethnic biases. Alternatively, the relationship could be non–
monotonic, perhaps U–shaped with the middle income groups having the least degree of ethnic biases. We avoid
pursuing these possibilities as we see them as being somewhat tangential to the main issues in this paper.
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values of γ. One could, of course, choose specific forms for the different functions in the model to
guarantee a singletonWγ for every feasible γ. One would require assumptions to guarantee that wγ
(which is defined by Wγ = {wγ}) is differentiable in s. Even at the sacrifice of some generality,
it is still interesting to understand how the swing group responds to shifts in s for the possible
candidate configurations.
For γ = (h, h), (l, l), the swing group is always w∗ for any s > 0. So what we need to check if the
relation between wγ and s for γ = (l, h). Basic intuition would suggest that increasing s would
make wγ (for γ = (l, h)) go down. Why? Roughly, the swing group in (l, h) is one where the h–
group has “negligible” bias whereas the l–group has a positive bias in favor of P . The “negligible
bias” for the h–group is because t(wγ) and s effectively cancel out. Hence, increasing s suggests
that wγ must go down for γ = (l, h). The following example is in line with our basic inituition.
AN EXAMPLE. Suppose that the ideological bias follows a logistic distribution, i.e., F (x) =
1
1+e−x and the downward–sloping function t(w) is simply w
∗ − w. Note, this immediately implies
t(w∗) = 0. Also, let the share of the l–type members be the same across all income levels, so
pi(w) = 1/2 − θ for every w ∈ [0, w] for some parameter θ ∈ (0, 1/2). It is easily checked that
these specific functional forms satisfy all the assumptions made in the baseline model.
Note, f(x) = f(−x) = e−x
(1+e−x)2 . Hence for γ = (l, h), we have f(t(w) + s) =
ew−w
∗−s
(1+ew−w∗−s)2 and
f(t(w)− s) = ew−w∗+s
(1+ew−w∗+s)2 .
Therefore, the function σ(γ, w) for γ = (l, h) is given by(1
2
− θ
)
.
[ ew−w∗−s
(1 + ew−w∗−s)2
]
+
(1
2
+ θ
)
.
[ ew−w∗+s
(1 + ew−w∗+s)2
]
.
The idea is to find the maxima of this function w.r.t w so as to identify the swing group. Differen-
tiating this function w.r.t. w and setting ∂σ(γ, w)/∂w = 0 yields:(1
2
− θ
)
.
[ ew−w∗−s
(1 + ew−w∗−s)2
]
.
[1− ew−w∗−s
1 + ew−w∗−s
]
=
(1
2
+ θ
)
.
[ ew−w∗+s
(1 + ew−w∗+s)2
]
.
[ew−w∗+s − 1
1 + ew−w∗+s
]
.
Define
z ≡ w − w∗.
Re-arranging terms and re-writing the above relation in terms of z yields
es−z
es+z
.
(es−z − 1)
(es+z − 1) .
(es+z + 1)3
(es−z + 1)3
=
1
2
+ θ
1
2
− θ . (3)
Noting that the RHS of equation (3) exceeds 1, we infer that z = 0 cannot be a solution. In fact,
applying Proposition 2 gives z < 0 for identifying the maxima. Also, s + z ≤ 0 does not satisfy
(3). Hence, all maxima must have z ∈ (−s, 0).
Define the function I(s, z) as follows:
I(s, z) ≡ e
s−z
es+z
.
(es−z − 1)
(es+z − 1) .
(es+z + 1)3
(es−z + 1)3
−
1
2
+ θ
1
2
− θ = 0.
22
Using the Implicit function theorem, we get
∂z
∂s
= −Is
Iz
=
(cosh(z)− 2cosh(s))sinh(s)−1sinh(z)
cosh(s)− 2cosh(z) .
For the range s > 0 and z < 0 (the region relevant for the maxima), we have ∂z
∂s
< 0.23 This, in
turn, implies wγ (for γ = (l, h) must go down as s goes up.
However, this need not be true in general; non–monotonicity is a possibility. Moreover, even within
the context of this example, there is another (and perhaps more subtle) issue: while it is true that the
equilibrium redistribution policy in a constituency with configuration (l, h) will be more favorable
towards poorer groups in a more (ethnically) biased society, the probability of (l, h) being a first
stage equilibrium choice is affected by the size of s. In particular, the expected–plurality payoff
to P from fielding l against R’s h–group candidate (denoted by WP (l, h)) depends upon s. It may
well be the case that WP (l, h) falls in s and in that case can go below WP (h, h) − χcP for some
adequately high value of s.
In sum, the overall effect on greater ethnic bias is ambiguous even in the restricted environment
of our example.24 This arises from the fact that while the redistribution certainly changes in a
definite direction for the configuration (l, h), the possibility of this very configuration arising in
equilibrium may well go down.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents some novel results on certain redistributive implications of political reservation
for minorities. We exploit the “swing voter” idea from previous models of electoral competition to
show that in the presence of ethnic biases, political quotas can potentially harm the interests of the
very minorities it was designed to benefit.
Our theory can readily talk to reservation for SCs in the Indian parliament. The SCs collectively are
an economically–disadvantaged minority at the national level. Interestingly, they are geographi-
cally quite evenly spread all over the country; so even in districts where they are more concentrated
they happen to be never much above 50% of the district population. Since the early 1980s they have
been politically active, in part, due to the impetus from pre–existing quotas. Moreover, the way
districts are chosen for SC reservation creates a bias towards selecting those districts where SCs are
relatively more numerous. Proposition 5 suggests that it is precisely such constituencies where the
mixed–ethnicity candidate configuration (l, h) is more likely to be observed prior to reservation.
In fact, the empirical correlations noted in Tables 1 and 2 are supportive of our approach.25
23The details of the calculation have been omitted in the interest of brevity.
24We need to make assumptions on the income distribution G(.) to get a clear answer.
25 We briefly mention the issue of the other closely related group, namely, the Scheduled Tribes (STs). STs are
quite distinct from SCs on at least two counts: (i) STs are not as well politically organized as SCs even today, so
political reservation has had limited impact on their political standing, unlike the SCs who are a political force to
reckon with today. (ii) STs tend to live in rural areas separate from other groups while SCs are spread more evenly in
the geographical sense. Hence, the model would not really apply to STs.
23
The theory can be useful for studying gender quotas. Women are a population minority in many
developing countries. In many occupations women typically are underpaid in comparison to males.
Also, there exist some within–group bias (by gender) possibly arising due to stereotypes about
gender roles. So the basic ingredients of the model are in place. However, it is difficult to develop
a notion of within–women economic inequality in an empirical exercise given that most households
have men and women co–habiting.
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Appendix
5.1 Tables
Table 1: Reservation and household participation in ‘Public Works’.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Logit Logit Logit Logit Probit OLS
Reserved dum. -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.376*** -0.166*** -0.016***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.054) (0.005)
Pce -0.295*** -0.256*** -0.186** -0.048 -0.020 -0.002
(0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.074) (0.033) (0.003)
SC dum. 0.062 0.046 0.014 -0.130* -0.056 -0.007*
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.035) (0.004)
Urban dum. -0.959*** -0.919*** -0.855*** -0.557*** -0.228*** -0.011**
(0.104) (0.102) (0.102) (0.212) (0.088) (0.005)
Hindu dum. 0.361*** 0.367*** 0.373*** 0.392*** 0.176*** 0.016***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.039) (0.003)
HH size 0.016* 0.019** 0.026*** 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.002***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.000)
Educ. -0.171*** -0.125** -0.060 -0.025 -0.003
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.026) (0.002)
Home dum. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employ dum. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.041 0.041 0.015
Observations 108,309 108,309 107,819 107,819 107,819 107,819
NOTES. Household–level regressions: Data on households come from the 43rd NSSO consumer
expenditure survey conducted in 1987-88. Data on reservation status of electoral districts
(“constituencies”) comes from the Parliamentary election data obtained from the Election Commission of
India. The dependent variable is a dummy variable Public Works which takes the value 1 if the household
had participated in Public Works for at least 60 days during the last 365 days and 0 otherwise. There are
542 constituencies spread over 338 districts. Although the NSSO survey is fairly extensive in terms of
household characteristics, it does not permit identification of the household all the way down to the
constituency; district is as far as one can go. So Reserved dum. is a dummy variable which takes the value
1 the household belongs to a district which has at least one reserved constituency, and 0 otherwise. Robust
standard errors (clustered by district) in parentheses. *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant
at 1%
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5.2 Proofs: Baseline Model
Proof. [PROPOSITION 1.] The arguments here closely parallel those in Theorem 1 of Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987). Let V (x(w), y(w)) ≡ pi(w)[1−F (d(w)−α(w, l))]+(1−pi(w))[1−F (d(w)−
α(w, h))]. Let d(w) represent the utility differential m(y, w)−m(x, w). Rewrite ∫
i
pi as
w∫
0
[V (x(w), y(w))] dG(w)
P ’s candidate seeks to maximize the integral above by choosing redistribution x while R’s candi-
date seeks to minimize the same by choosing y. Suppose (x,y) is an equilibrium of this expected–
plurality game.
Pick any w in [0, w]. For this group w,
Vx(w) = [pi(w)f(d(w)− α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− α(w, h))]u′(w + x(w)).
Note, Vx(w) > 0 since both f , u′ > 0. Also, Vx(w) is continuous in w and this implies the value of
Vx(w) must be the same for every w in [0, w]. Suppose not. Let w1 and w2 be two distinct income
levels such that Vx(w1) > Vx(w2). A marginal decrease in x(w) in a small enough interval around
w2 accompanied by a marginal increase in x(w) in a small interval around w1 while respecting the
budget constraint improves expected plurality for P , contradicting that (x,y) is an equilibrium.
Hence, we can write the following:
[pi(w)f(d(w)− α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− α(w, h))]u′(w + x(w)) = λγ (4)
for every w ∈ [0, w] and some λγ > 0.
Now consider ∂V
∂y(w)
. Analogous arguments apply in this case and hence we can claim
[pi(w)f(d(w)− α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− α(w, h))]u′(w + y(w)) = µγ (5)
for every w ∈ [0, w] and some µγ > 0.
Comparing equations (4) and (5) for any group w yields u
′(w+x(w))
u′(w+y(w)) =
λγ
µγ
which is a constant. This
implies that in any equilibrium x = y given the strict concavity of u and that both x and y are
balanced–budget redistributions. Suppose not. Assume that for some w1, w.l.o.g. x(w1) > y(w1).
By u
′(w+x(w))
u′(w+y(w)) =
λγ
µγ
, this implies x(w) > y(w) for every w in violation of the budget constraint.
Thus, d(w) = 0 for every group w. Imputing this in equation (4) and using the symmetry of f
around 0, we get for every group w:
σ(γ, w)[u′(w + x(w))] = λγ. (6)
This guarantees that w + x(w) varies positively with σ(γ, w) given the strict concavity of u. The
same equation can be utilized to show the uniqueness of equilibrium. Suppose that both (x, λ) and
(x′, λ′) satisfy (6). If λ = λ′ then x = x′ by the strict concavity of u. Alternatively if λ < λ′ then
x > x′ for the same reason. However, this implies that both x and x′ cannot be balanced-budget
redistributions. Hence it must be that (x, λ) = (x′, λ′).
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Proof. [PROPOSITION 2.] Note, γ = (l, h) implies that every l–group voter associates positively
with P ′s candidate while every h–group voter associates positively with R′s candidate. Hence,
α(w, l) = t(w) + s and α(w, h) = t(w)− s.
The derivative of σ(γ, w) w.r.t. w when evaluated at w∗ is the following:
f ′(s)t′(w∗)[2pi(w∗)− 1].
This term is negative since pi(w∗) < 1/2 and both f ′(s) and t′(w∗) are negative. So, wγ 6= w∗.
Suppose wγ > w∗. Hence, t(wγ) ≤ 0 and
σ(γ, wγ) = pi(wγ)f(t(wγ) + s) + (1− pi(wγ))f(t(wγ)− s). (7)
It must be that t(wγ) + s ≥ 0. Suppose not. Consider wˆ such that t(wˆ) + s = 0. Clearly, wˆ < wγ
since t is decreasing in w.
So,
σ(γ, wˆ) = pi(wˆ)f(0) + (1− pi(wˆ))f(t(wˆ)− s).
Also
σ(γ, wˆ) ≥ pi(wγ)f(0) + (1− pi(wγ))f(t(wˆ)− s) > σ(γ, wγ). (8)
where the first inequality comes from pi(wˆ) ≥ pi(wγ). The second inequality follows from the
unimodality and symmetry of f around 0 and by observing that
|t(wˆ)− s| = 2s < |t(wγ)− s|.
Hence, it must be that s+ t(wγ) ≥ 0.
Now, corresponding to wγ , one can always find a group w˜ ∈ [w,w∗) such that t(w˜) = −t(wγ) > 0.
This is possible since t(w) ≥ s by assumption. For this group w˜,
σ(γ, w˜) = pi(w˜)f (t(w˜) + s) + (1− pi(w˜))f (s− t(w˜)) (9)
Now compare equations (7) and (9). Since t(w˜) = −t(wγ) and 1− pi(w˜) > 1/2 > pi(wγ), it must
be that σ(γ, w˜) > σ(γ, wγ). This leads to a contradiction which establishes the proposition.
Proof. [PROPOSITION 3.] In a constituency where e(P ) = e(R), for any group w:
σ(γ, w) = pi(w)f(t(w)) + (1− pi(w))f(t(w)) = f(t(w)).
Clearly, the above is maximized at w = w∗ given that f is unimodal and symmetric around 0 and
that t(w∗) = 0.
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Proof. [PROPOSITION 4.] Suppose γ = (h, l) is the first–stage equilibrium choice in an unre-
served constituency. Since party R is fielding an l–group candidate, it must be
WR(h, l) + χcR ≥ WR(h, h). (10)
Now suppose that party P deviates to fielding an l–group candidate. Given that γ = (h, l) is part
of the equilibrium, such a deviation should not be profitable for party P . Hence,
WP (l, l) + χcP −WP (h, l) ≤ 0. (11)
However,
WP (l, l) + χcP −WP (h, l) = WP (l, l) + χcP +WR(h, l) = WP (h, h) + χcP +WR(h, l) (12)
where the last equality follows from Proposition 3. However,
WP (h, h) + χcP +WR(h, l) ≥ WP (h, h) +WR(h, h)− χcR + χcP = χ(cP − cR) > 0
where the first inequality follows from the relation in (10). Therefore,
WP (l, l) + χcP −WP (h, l) > 0.
This contradicts the relation in (11) and thus establishes the proposition.
Proof. [PROPOSITION 5.] Increasing pi(w) for at least one income group while making no other
changes implies an increase in WP (l, h) since F (−t(w)− s) < F (−t(w) + s). Note, WP (h, h) is
unaffected. Clearly, if (1) was satisfied earlier, it continues to be so after the change in the size of
the l–group.
5.3 Proofs: Extensions of the Model
Proof. [PROPOSITION 6.]
Note, γ = (l, h) implies that α(w, l) = t(w) + s and α(w, h) = t(w)− s.
Recall P ′s FOC for any w:
[ν(γ, w)− ρ(w)]u′(x(w) + w) = λ. (13)
Given the strict concavity of u(.), wP is where ν(γ, w) − ρ(w) is maximized. Analogously (from
R′s FOC), wR is where ν(γ, w) is maximized.
Note,
ν(γ, w∗) = f(s).
For any w > w∗,
ν(γ, w) = pi(w)f(d(w)− t(w)− s) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− t(w) + s).
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where d(w)− t(w) > 0. The RHS is lower than
pi(w∗)f(s− ) + (1− pi(w∗))f(s+ )
for some  ∈ (0, s] by the unimodality and symmetry of f around 0. Therefore, under C1,
ν(γ, w) < f(s)
for any w > w∗. This implies wj ≤ w∗ for j = P,R.
To rule out wP = w∗, note the following. For any w < w∗,
ν(γ, w) = pi(w)f(d(w)− t(w)− s) + (1− pi(w))f(d(w)− t(w) + s).
where d(w)− t(w) < 0. Let δw ≡ t(w)− d(w) for any w ≤ w∗. Clearly, δw ≥ 0 with δ∗w = 0. If
we can establish that there is some δw > 0 such that
pi(w)f(s+ δw) + (1− pi(w))f(s− δw) ≥ f(s) = ν(γ, w∗)
then we are done.
Define τ(w) ≡ (1 − pi(w))[f(s − δw) − f(s)] + pi(w)[f(s + δw) − f(s)]. Hence, showing that
τ(w) ≥ 0 for some w < w∗ will establish wP < w∗.
Pick any w arbitrarily close to w∗ such that δw > 0 but infinitesimal. Hence,
τ(w) = δw{(1− pi(w))[f(s− δw)− f(s)
δw
] + pi(w)[
f(s+ δw)− f(s)
δw
]}
Given that δw is arbitrarily close to 0,
τ(w) ≈ δw{(pi(w)− 1)f ′(s− δw) + pi(w)f ′(s)} ≈ (2pi(w)− 1)f ′(s)δw > 0.
This implies wP < w∗ and establishes the proposition.
Proof. [PROPOSITION 7.] Under such candidate configurations, the ethnic bias for every voter
loses relevance, i.e. α(w, h) = α(w, l) = t(w) for every income group w.
Consider party P’s FOC for any w:
[f(d(w)− t(w))− ρ(w)]u′(x(w) + w) = λ.
For w = w∗, this takes the following form:
f(0)u′(x(w∗) + w∗) = λ
Recall,
d(w),−t(w) < 0 if w < w∗
d(w) = t(w) = 0 if w = w∗
d(w),−t(w) > 0 if w > w∗
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Now, we claim that the most favored group for party P , i.e., wP is actually w∗. First, we show that
f(0) > f(d(w)− t(w))− ρ(w)
for any w < w∗.
Take any w < w∗. Now,
f(0)− f(t(w)) < f(0)− f(d(w)− t(w))
since d(w),−t(w) < 0 and f is symmetric around 0. Hence,
f(0)− f(t(w)) + ρ(w) < f(0)− f(d(w)− t(w)) + ρ(w).
But the LHS is non-negative by C2. Hence,
f(0)− f(d(w)− t(w)) + ρ(w) > 0
which gives wP 6= w < w∗.
For w > w∗,
f(0) > f(d(w)− t(w))− ρ(w)
since ρ(w) > 0 for such w and by the unimodality and symmetry of f around 0. This establishes
wP = w
∗.
Party R′s FOC for any w is
f(d(w)− t(w))u′(y(w) + w) = µ.
We have f(0) > f(d(w) − t(w)) for w 6= w∗ by the unimodality and symmetry of f around 0.
This establishes wR = w∗.
Proof. [PROPOSITION 8.] Start with w = w∗. Consider w < w∗ but arbitrarily close, i.e., w∗ − 
where → 0. First, we claim that for → 0, x(w∗ − ) > x(w∗). Suppose not. Recall,
σ(γ, w) ≡ pi(w)f(α(w, l)) + (1− pi(w))f(α(w, h)).
For γ = (l, h), the derivative of this term w.r.t. w is negative when evaluated at w∗ (shown in
Proposition 2). Note, θ(w∗ − ;ψ) ≥ σ(γ, w∗ − )u′(w∗ −  + x(w∗ − )) by the optimality of
(x(w∗ − , l), x(w∗ − , h)). But x(w∗ − ) ≤ x(w∗) and the negative derivative of σ at w∗ imply
σ(γ, w∗ − )u′(w∗ − + x(w∗ − )) > σ(γ, w∗)u′(w∗ + x(w∗)) = f(s)u′(w∗ + x(w∗)).
But f(s)u′(w∗ + x(w∗)) = θ(w∗;ψ) and θ(w∗;ψ) must equal θ(w∗ − ;ψ). Hence, contradiction
and the claim is established.
Now take any w > w∗. Call it wˆ. Note, θ(wˆ;ψ) ≥ σ(γ, wˆ)u′(wˆ + x(wˆ)) by the optimality of
(x(wˆ, l), x(wˆ, h)). Appyling the same logic as in Proposition 2, we can find w˜ < w∗ such that
t(w˜) = −t(wˆ) > 0. It immediately follows that σ(γ, w˜) > σ(γ, wˆ).
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Now, if θ(wˆ;ψ) = σ(γ, wˆ)u′(wˆ + x(wˆ)), then w˜ + x(w˜) > wˆ + x(wˆ). Otherwise, θ(w˜;ψ) will
exceed θ(wˆ;ψ) leading to violation of the FOC w.r.t. x(w).
Suppose θ(wˆ;ψ) > σ(γ, wˆ)u′(wˆ+x(wˆ)). Note however, that increasing ψ decreases the difference
between x(w, l) and x(w, h) for any given x(w) and w. This implies that θ(wˆ;ψ) approaches
σ(γ, wˆ)u′(wˆ + x(wˆ)) from above as ψ increases. In fact, by continuity there exists a threshold
level of ψ, call it ψ(wˆ), such that
θ(wˆ;ψ) ≤ σ(γ, w˜)u′(wˆ + x(wˆ))
for all ψ ≥ ψ(wˆ). Define ψ ≡ sup{w>w∗}ψ(wˆ). For any ψ ≥ ψ, it must be that w + x(w) is
maximized at w < w∗.
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